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CLASS ACTION ADVICE IN THE FORM
OF QUESTIONS
EDWARD H. COOPER*
The opportunity to offer advice to those who are considering the
adoption or modification of class or group action procedures for other
legal systems is both welcome and distracting.  It is welcome because
it forces a change of perspective in the attempt to contemplate adap-
tation of United States practice to different cultures, political struc-
tures, substantive laws, and courts with dissimilar surrounding proce-
dures.  It is distracting because there are so many different levels of
possible comparison that the choice of perspective must be tailored to
the immediate occasion.  It is tempting to take on the most important
Copyright  2001 by Edward H. Cooper.
* This essay is not a formal scholarly paper.  It is a commentary provoked by reactions to the
elegant scholarship embodied in this Symposium.  The observations made in this essay about the
recent evolution and proposed revisions of class-action practice in the United States are drawn from
several years of work with the United States Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, as it has studied possible changes in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  The written accounts
of this work are voluminous.  The products more readily available include the following: 1-4
WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO CIVIL RULE 23 (1997) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]; THOMAS WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (1996) [hereinafter EMPIRICAL STUDY]; THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND THE WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT
ON MASS TORT LITIGATION (1999) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS].  Parallel em-
pirical research is described in DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING
PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000).  Additional materials include the agenda books of the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee, the minutes of its meetings, and its reports to the Standing Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure; these materials are available on the Judiciary Web Page.
Many of the observations made in this essay summarize, and at times translate, different
comments made by many people on multiple occasions.  This essay is the Author’s synthesis.
An attempt to adhere to scholarly convention by providing multiple citations to the underlying
materials at every turn would be distracting.  It would be unfair to attribute to any single person
the composite views cohered by the Author.  These observations are a personal distillation of
vicarious experience, assimilated here with the hope of generating interest and providing useful
commentary.  As a result there is a comparative dearth of footnotes.  The measure of success
will often be that a reader wishes for the comfort of a footnote supporting an observation that
has stimulated curiosity.
(The Author has been Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules since October
1992.  The obligatory disclaimer is by now redundant: the observations offered here are not to
be attributed in any way to the Advisory Committee.)
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sets of questions—for example, to ask if non-governmental individu-
als, organizations, or lawyers should replace individual litigants in
larger scale litigation so as to facilitate efficiency or remedy wrongs
that otherwise would go unredressed.  These questions can be ad-
dressed only within the framework of a particular society and its po-
litical and governmental structures. There is little point in attempting
to provide answers good for all settings.  At the other end, however,
there is no point in attempting to address matters of minute detail.  A
more suitable middle ground can be found in a series of questions
raised by more than eight years of witnessing the work of the Advi-
sory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as it has
grappled with possible revisions of Civil Rule 23.  These questions are
more helpful than even provisional answers would be—the questions
are much the same for most systems, while the answers often will be
different.
I.  FRAMEWORK QUESTIONS
A.  Should We Do It at All?
The broad question is whether to create a procedural vehicle that
authorizes a real person, private organization, lawyer, or public entity to
conduct litigation that enforces or terminates the rights of someone who
does not participate directly as a party.  The common concept is that the
party in court somehow “represents” the person who is not in court.
Litigation by representation is a reasonably familiar concept: the trustee
of an express trust represents the beneficiaries, the representative of an
estate binds those who claim through the estate, and so on.  The more
specific issue within the broad question is whether representation can be
justified by the number of people who may have similar rights (or du-
ties) growing out of some factually related nexus of events and who are
not otherwise related to each other or to the representative.  The num-
ber may be small—examples include a class of seven or more in Austra-
lia,1 and two or more in Canada.2  In deciding on the need for represen-
tation in this setting, one must first determine what purpose is to be
served.
1. See S. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, Multi-Plaintiff Litigation in Australia: A Compara-
tive Perspective, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 289 (2001).
2. See Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 269 (2001).
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In determining purpose, a comparison to alternative means of en-
forcement is required.  Why do we need representative group litigation
at all?  Much of the pressure for group litigation springs from the per-
ception that more explicitly public means are not adequate to meet a
society’s felt needs for enforcement.  Government agencies may lack re-
sources or will to enforce public or private rights, or may be too closely
aligned with wrongdoers, public or private.
Alternative means of private enforcement may also fail.  The most
basic comparison is to individual litigation, one plaintiff at a time.  But
this comparison extends to many alternative means of joining multiple
claims: voluntary joinder of two or more plaintiffs in a single action,
consolidation of separate actions separately initiated (a device that may
include actions initially filed in different courts), intervention by new
parties in litigation commenced by others, “test case” litigation, resort to
“nonmutual preclusion,” and bankruptcy.
When comparing representative group litigation with the alterna-
tives, the numbers required to support group litigation should be ex-
amined.  If the number may be as few as two or seven, the comparisons
to voluntary joinder, consolidation, intervention, and other simple de-
vices is different than when the number is 50, 500, or higher.  If there are
only two claimants, for example, it is difficult to know why it does not
suffice for both to join in a single action.  The less aggressive claimant
can always cede full operating control to the other.  If the second mem-
ber of the class has notice and an opportunity to request exclusion, the
“class action” seems little more than a convenient means of inviting
voluntary joinder on terms that may reduce the fear of becoming in-
volved.3
As the numbers grow, attention tends to focus on efficiency and
enforcement.  Efficiency in part reflects cost savings; it may be less
expensive to litigate common issues once and for all than to litigate
them repeatedly.  At the same time, more resources can be devoted
to common litigation than any single litigant could lavish on a unique
claim, enhancing the quality of the competing presentations and the
ultimate decision.  This one decision not only is more trustworthy, but
also—if it is the first and only resolution of the common issues—
avoids the risk of inconsistent judicial pronouncements.  The cost
savings include judicial time and redound to the benefit of parties in
3. The Canadian practice described by Professor Watson, for example, protects a class mem-
ber against liability for a successful adversary’s attorney fees.  See id.  It is unclear whether the sys-
tem is designed to protect against the risk that two would-be plaintiffs, one solvent and the other
judgment-proof, might choose a “class action” brought by the judgment-proof class member for the
purpose of shielding the solvent non-representative class member.
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include judicial time and redound to the benefit of parties in unre-
lated litigation whose access to court is facilitated as judicial resources
are freed by the class action efficiencies.
Efficiency justifications merge with enforcement concerns with re-
spect to claims that would not—and often could not—be enforced by
individual litigation.  It is common to focus on “small claims” consumer
litigation, but this phenomenon may extend well beyond such claims.
Even sizable claims may go unredressed because of the cost, uncer-
tainty, and fear of litigation.  For example, individual claimants may
reap millions of dollars in a U.S. antitrust class action, in circumstances
in which few or none would have undertaken the burden of litigating
alone.  There may be other deterrents to litigation as well, particularly
when minorities seek to enforce their rights to be protected from dis-
crimination or when citizens seek to call government officials to ac-
count.
The enforcement concern extends beyond the desire to achieve re-
lief for individual claimants.  There is a parallel desire to achieve en-
forcement against lawbreakers.  The most common expressions speak
of disgorging the fruits of unlawful activity.  Disgorgement is desired in
part for its own sake, and in part to deter others from conduct that can
yield large profits through the endless repetition of petty injuries that do
not sustain individual enforcement.  On this view, a class judgment
would be desirable even if no relief were distributed to class members.
These motives for class enforcement seem laudable enough.  They do
not, however, defeat the need for critical appraisal.
Many of the questions commonly raised about group litigation
concern the possibility that the group claim will fail or will seem to be
enforced on terms less favorable than might be won through alternative
means of litigation.
Other questions arise from the problems that may grow out of
successful enforcement of the group claim.  The problem raised most
frequently is the fear that the risks and costs of defending class litiga-
tion will coerce a settlement that rewards an unworthy claim.  “Le-
galized blackmail” has become a routine phrase in the vocabulary of
some critics.  The fear can be expressed in terms of simple arithmetic:
suppose 1,000 people hold identical claims that, litigated alone, would
lead to 100 plaintiff judgments and 900 defense judgments.  If the
same probability holds for group litigation, there is a 10% risk that li-
ability will be enforced as to all 1,000 group members.  A narrow risk-
neutral argument can be made that aggregation in a class action
makes no difference: a 10% risk of losing all 1,000 claims has the
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same value (cost) as a certainty of losing 100 of the 1,000 claims.  This
argument is unpersuasive because the probabilities are not the same.
With the small claims, few or none would be brought in the first
place—a win-loss ratio of 1 in 10 would quickly discourage any added
attempts.  With the large claims, there is a more subtle risk, even on
the unrealistic assumption that each claim in fact would be asserted.
The fact that so many people believe they have been harmed has a
psychological impact, as does the prospect of mistakenly denying re-
covery to so many.  Quite apart from the level of effort that is de-
voted to litigation on both sides, the aggregation of many claims
changes the calculus of decision.  The risks also are different.  If the
individual claims are small, the cost of defending a class action may
couple with a small risk of losing to the entire class to coerce a “nui-
sance-value” settlement.  If the individual claims are large, the risk
may be seen as a “bet-your-company” risk that coerces settlement to
avoid the prospect of bankruptcy.
Over-enforcement, another fear, is discussed less often.  This fear
focuses on substantive policies that are obscure or simply foolish.  Well-
intentioned legislators may address perceived problems in broad and
general terms; in the United States, details often are filled in by adminis-
trative regulation.  Those who are regulated often struggle valiantly to
determine their obligations, but even the valiant may misjudge.  The
“injury” that is compensated by a class judgment may be an artifact of
debatable interpretation of inscrutable law.  The law itself, whether
clear or obscure, may be simply ill-advised.  The fear of class action
judgments, moreover, may drive those who are regulated to avoid de-
sirable conduct, harming the very people the law is intended to serve.
Further, the disgorgement image seldom reckons with the prospect that
defendants are not rewarded for conferring benefits beyond those man-
dated by law—the balance between the costs of beneficial over-
compliance and the profits of good-faith violation may be even, but the
defendant disgorges the profits and has no off-set for the benefits con-
ferred on the same class.
More thorough enforcement raises real questions even without
characterizing it as over-enforcement.  Class action devices will change
the real world effect of some existing substantive laws, and it may be
difficult to predict which laws will be most affected.  Some substantive
laws have little meaning because little enforced.  Providing an efficient
procedural tool that leads to widespread enforcement changes, and may
transform, the social, political, and economic reality.  Not everyone will
be pleased.
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These concerns cannot be addressed in a generic way that tran-
scends the boundaries of any particular legal system.  These concerns
are troubling in a society that has expensive procedure, institutions that
encourage litigation of weak claims, and substantial areas of obscure or
overreaching substantive law.  They may seem inconsequential in a so-
ciety where liability is visited only on those who in fact have violated
clearly comprehensible and substantively worthy law.
B.  Who Should Be Representative?
Once it is decided to create a procedure that binds nonparticipating
group members by the litigating efforts of a group representative, the
representative must still be identified.
Group representation by government officials is one possibility.
Many forms of government litigation can be seen in this light, particu-
larly when the government seeks a remedy on behalf of a relatively nar-
row group.  Representation by private organizations is another possibil-
ity.  In the United States, familiar examples include the “standing” of
civil rights and environmental protection groups to seek remedies for
injury to their members.
Another possibility is representation by a class member who
takes the initiative, finds counsel, and launches litigation—the Civil
Rule 23 model.  This model may be fulfilled in practice, and proce-
dural devices may be adopted (as in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act) to encourage its fulfillment.  Yet in practice it may be
counsel rather than client who takes the initiative.  Courts have be-
come familiar with the gambit of showing that a would-be class repre-
sentative has little or no understanding of the litigation, and have be-
come comfortable with placing reliance for effective representation
on class counsel rather than the representative class member.  This
phenomenon leads to common complaints that class actions fail the
elementary condition of adversary litigation: there is no client, only a
lawyer who determines the objectives and chooses the means of litiga-
tion without consultation or constraint.
The prospect of lawyer-driven group litigation need not chill en-
thusiasm.  Private attorneys general may serve the public interest effec-
tively and well.  They may courageously pursue wrongs that elected or
politically appointed officials ignore.  They may devote resources that
are simply not available to public officials.  (Of course, the lack of public
enforcement resources may reflect a political judgment that a particular
law should not be fully enforced.  Then private enforcement resources
threaten over-enforcement.)  Part of the process of shaping rules for
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group litigation must be to account for the capacities and character of
the private lawyers who will be taking on the enforcement responsibil-
ity.
C.  Beware of the Unexpected
Much of the history of procedural reform in the United States sug-
gests that devices designed with one set of expectations gradually grow
to serve quite different purposes.  The growth often results from the de-
liberate choice to craft open-ended rules that rely on the discretion of
trial judges, and on a process of common law evolution that adjusts to
the lessons of experience and to the new needs that emerge from new
substantive law.  Discovery is a familiar example that has not won much
following in the rest of the world.  The Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class ac-
tion is another example. During hearings on some of the recent propos-
als to amend Rule 23, three veterans of the process that yielded the 1966
amendment testified or commented that no one had anticipated the
uses that actually have been made of the rule.4
The unexpected may be good.  As noted, the Federal Rules often
are deliberately drawn with knowledge that unexpected problems will
arise and with faith that good judges, given adequate discretion, will
achieve better solutions than those which could be captured in more de-
tailed texts.  This process is not always one-way.  Although the text of
Rule 23 has not changed since 1966, apart from adoption of a new ap-
peal opportunity,5 many observers believe that administration of the
Rule has changed significantly in recent years.  Federal judges are re-
garded as increasingly reluctant to certify class actions.  If that is so, it
may reflect a self-correcting process in which the impetus of evolution
has been carried too far, only to be reined in as experience shows the
excesses.  And if there is a self-correcting process, excesses of self-
correction may lead in turn to a reaction that returns to freer class certi-
fication practices.
4. Testimony on the proposals published for comment in 1996 is gathered in Volume 3 of the
WORKING PAPERS.  See generally WORKING PAPERS, supra note *.  Testimony by those who par-
ticipated in framing the 1966 amendments that included present Civil Rule 23(b)(3) includes Wil-
liam T. Coleman, Jr., Esq., a member of the Advisory Committee, Philadelphia hearing, and Profes-
sor Arthur R. Miller, who assisted the Advisory Committee Reporter, San Francisco Hearing.  See
WORKING PAPERS, supra note *, at 63-64, 204.  Written comments are gathered in Volume 2 of the
WORKING PAPERS.  An extensive statement on the origin of Rule 23(b)(3) was provided by John P.
Frank, Esq., a member of the Advisory Committee who reports that some dissented from its adop-
tion.  See 2 WORKING PAPERS, supra note *, at 262, 264-270.
5. Rule 23(f) took effect December 1, 1998.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
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The unexpected may also be not good.  Another part of the task of
framing group litigation rules is to assess the prospect that undesirable
developments can be corrected.  Where do the rules come from—legis-
lation or a judicial rulemaking process?  What are the realistic opportu-
nities for relatively neutral evaluation of experience?  Can the lessons of
experience—including rigorous empirical investigation—be translated
into rule amendments when needed?
A system that has not had experience with procedures similar to
modern class actions may reasonably proceed with caution.  The more
detailed questions described below deserve close attention.  Even closer
attention is required if unlucky drafting is not easily cured by judicial
creativity and if mistaken choices are not readily cured by amendment.
D.  Character of Litigation, Bench, and Bar
The questions already described were framed by the role litigation
generally plays in a society, by the character of judicial institutions in
both structure and procedure, by the character of judges and the view
they have of their role, and by the character and role of the bar.  Is it
generally accepted that litigation should be used to right broad social
wrongs?  Should courts be free to displace unresponsive legislatures?
How responsible are judges for developing specific litigation?  An “um-
pire-like” judge in a lawyer-directed system who follows the lead of ad-
versary advocates to profound social change may seem to be less re-
sponsible, and acting more within a judicial role, than a judge in a more
judge-directed system who assumes responsibility for framing the litiga-
tion that then calls for resolution of profound social questions.  The ad-
versary class action bar that has emerged in the United States is able to
devote boundless imagination, millions of dollars, and thousands of
hours to discovering (the doubters would say creating) and pursuing
wide-scale wrongs.  How long will it take for the bars of other countries
to follow this example, and how well will such activity fit within their
other professional traditions and roles?
An especially complex set of questions arises from the relationship
between the court and lawyers defined by a particular legal system.  The
greater the responsibility assumed by the court for investigating and de-
veloping the action, the less concern may be felt for preserving individ-
ual participation by the parties through their lawyers.  Concerns for con-
flicting interests among class members may be transmuted.  The judge
does not represent any class member, and to the extent that the judge
directs the lawyers on the matters to be developed and presented, it
may be possible to trust the judge more than we trust lawyers in a sys-
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tem that relies on lawyers to develop the case to serve the best interests
of their clients.  The importance and role of representative parties may
be subtly shaped by the increased responsibility the judge has for guid-
ing case preparation.  This sense of responsibility may at times make it
more difficult for the judge, as both inquirer and decider, to “let down”
the class by rejecting its claims.  A judge, on the other hand, may find it
difficult to muster the enormous energies and creativity that class action
lawyers often have demonstrated in the United States.
Other differences as well arise from systems that assign to the
judge substantial responsibility for directing the development of litiga-
tion, often through a series of stages that substitute for the single-event
trial that characterizes common law tradition.  To anticipate a more par-
ticular point, this involvement may affect such issues as consideration of
probable merit in deciding whether to certify a class.  In a judicially di-
rected proceeding, for example, it may be so difficult to fence out pre-
liminary views of the merits that open consideration should be permit-
ted.
Another difference of traditions is relevant to shaping class action
rules.  Rule 23 has been developed to rely heavily on trial judge discre-
tion, not only in administering a class proceeding, but also in the very
determination of whether there is to be a class proceeding—whether to
certify a class.  Avowed discretion characterizes most aspects of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The first question is whether judges
in a particular system are familiar, or can be made comfortable, with
comparable levels of discretion.  Reliance on discretion may not be pos-
sible in a procedural system that relies on detailed and controlling rules:
“Inflexible is simple.”6  Judges and lawyers not accustomed to proce-
dural discretion may not be well served by open-ended rules in this most
complex area. Development of detailed rules that preclude discretion-
ary decisionmaking, however, may place more trust in foresight than
most rulemaking processes can bear.  It may be difficult to substitute
rules for discretion.  In any event, the shape of class action practice gov-
erned more by rules and less by discretion will be quite different from
Rule 23.
E.  Traditions of Individualism
It is fair to say that there is currently no coherent theory to recon-
cile Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with U.S. traditions
6. Antonio Gidi, Remarks at the Duke/Geneva Conference on Debates over Group Litiga-
tion in Comparative Perspective: What Can We Learn from Each Other? (July 21-22, 2000).
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of individualism.  It is individualism—and perhaps a reluctant recogni-
tion of litigation’s fallibility—that underlies our abiding tradition that
each person is entitled to a personal day in court.  Rule 23 sharply re-
duces individualism when a mandatory class is certified, denying any
opportunity to request exclusion and drastically limiting the role of non-
representative class members.  Rule 23 also reduces individualism when
an “opt-out” class is certified, given the difficulties of conveying mean-
ingful notice and prompting careful attention to the decision whether to
request exclusion.  These concerns are not fully allayed by the justifica-
tions that class adjudication achieves efficiency, enforces rights whose
holders desire but cannot afford enforcement, and achieves the social
good of enforcing the law.  They are little allayed by the same justifica-
tions when the outcome rests not on adjudication but on privately nego-
tiated settlement, even though court approval may be given.
The abstract traditions of individualism translate into more specific
concerns with litigation.  The selection of time, court, co-parties, and
adversaries can have important effects on outcome.  Litigation choices
made within the action likewise have important effects.  One person
may make different choices than another, perhaps because different
choices are better for each, but perhaps because one understands the
choices better or is luckier.  Being forced to surrender these choices in
the name of group efficiency can have a profound impact on the even-
tual result.  It may also have an impact on a party’s subjective experi-
ence, on what are now called “process values.”  It is easier to accept the
result after responsible participation in the process.
Individualism presents particularly pointed problems when a class
is defined in terms that include members with conflicting interests.  The
more ambitious attempts to bring mass torts into class form have illus-
trated multiple and obvious conflicts among members with different
forms of injury, different histories of exposure, different opportunities
to seize alternative forums and choices of law, differently urgent needs
for prompt relief, and so on.  Equally apparent conflicts may emerge in
the familiar forms of injunction class actions.  For example, members of
a class seeking to desegregate a public school system not only may have
different ideas, but different interests for the shape of the remedy.  The
theory that well-intentioned class representatives, often supported by
prominent organizations, can adequately decide which interests to sub-
ordinate may be necessary, but we should not be comfortable with it.
The questions of individual participation and control cannot be an-
swered generally.  Abstract theory may lead to conclusions that bear lit-
tle relation to reality.  It may be appropriate, for example, to recognize a
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pragmatic distinction between actions on claims that are not likely to be
pursued individually and actions on claims that are likely to be pursued
individually by a significant number of class members.  If there is no in-
dividual litigation, the loss of individual control means little.  However,
a theoretical articulation and implementation of this perception is not
easy.  Abstract theory may also be pushed too far in seeking out con-
flicts of interest that might require an endless proliferation of classes or
subclasses.  Members of a class affected by a petty consumer fraud, for
example, might have different interests in the remedial choices between
restitution, damages, discounts on future purchases, or injunctive relief.
Individual participation and control may indicate a point at which
inquisitorial systems have an advantage over adversarial systems.  Each
increase in the level of the judge’s responsibility for directing and de-
fining the litigation reduces the importance of party participation and
the significance of conflicting interests.  In time, class-based litigation
may prove more suitable to civil law systems than to the common law
systems that have fed its early growth.
F.  Interjurisdictional Reach
Class action practice in the United States encounters problems of
parallel, duplicating, and often competing class actions.  Duplication oc-
curs among federal courts, among the courts of different states, and be-
tween state and federal courts.  State courts often define classes that in-
clude nonresidents, and with some frequency define nationwide classes.
It would not be difficult to reduce the resulting problems by legislation.
The most likely approaches, however, would require that a single court
be given control, defined in reference to a broad class.  Almost inevita-
bly, the controlling court would be a federal court, although a more
complex system could be drafted.  Effective limits on state courts most
likely would limit state-court classes to members connected to the state.
State citizenship or injury in the state are likely to be effective, while fo-
cus on “conduct” in the state is less likely to be effective.  State courts
would remain free to enforce state law, but probably not in all the cir-
cumstances in which they would choose to enforce their own law if left
free from federal control.  The prospect for such legislation is clouded;
some current legislative efforts go so much further toward defeating any
state class actions that they are likely to fail due to their own over-
reaching.
Other countries may not encounter parallel problems soon, but
they may arise and they deserve present consideration.  Countries that
have federal systems including both state and national courts are obvi-
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ous candidates.  Countries that join regional unions—now, prominently,
the European Union—will soon come to be seen as equally obvious
candidates.  But countries with unitary governments will not be im-
mune.  Environmental pollution, an atomic energy accident, distribution
of investment securities, a defective product, questionable trade prac-
tices, and many other acts—including government acts—may have per-
vasive effects that disregard political borders.  Outside a federation or
union, public international law (particularly in the form of treaty or
convention) can address these problems.  But it will be difficult to stem
the burgeoning interest in group litigation as an alternative mode of
regulation.
Many of the problems of inter-jurisdictional class litigation could
be reduced dramatically by resort to opt-in classes.  But if opt-out or
mandatory classes are preferred, difficult questions must be addressed.
Should a single country undertake the adjudication of claims held by
citizens of other countries?  What nexus to the forum should be re-
quired?  What limits on choice of law may be essential?  Is there any
satisfactory way, short of explicit convention, to ensure that other coun-
tries will recognize the res judicata effects of the judgment?
The familiar problems of meshing the substantive and procedural
laws of different jurisdictions will be aggravated by the question
whether to recognize differences in institutional realities.  The same in-
jury, inflicted in violation of identical substantive rules and pursued to a
favorable judgment, may have quite different values in different legal
systems.  A personal injury tort recovery is likely to be predictably dif-
ferent among different courts within the United States, but the meanest
of them all is likely to be more generous than most of the other judicial
systems in the world.7  Similar disparities surely exist among other pairs
of judicial systems.  Should this reality defeat transnational aggregation?
Should a court attempt the implausible task of justifying different reme-
dies that distinguish among the plaintiffs before it according to the likely
outcome in their “home” tribunals?  Or do the advantages of aggrega-
tion support uniform recoveries for all class members without regard to
the leveling effect?
To the extent that these problems can be avoided, effectively con-
fining class actions to events within a single legal regime and avoiding
overlapping actions, it may be possible to adopt stronger class proce-
dures.  At a minimum, peripheral problems will be avoided.  The re-
7. See Lord Denning, quoted in 15 C.A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2d § 3828, 284 n. 20 (1986) [hereinafter WRIGHT ET AL.).
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sulting undistracted focus on a single action may improve the result.
The risks that competing classes may lead by “reverse auction” to set-
tlement on terms that traduce class interests may be dramatically re-
duced.  Competing class member interests in choice of law, choice of fo-
rum, and tactics are similarly reduced.  It may be a dream, but a unitary
system that can reasonably confine class proceedings to domestic events
may be in the best position to develop a truly rational procedure.
G.  Not All Classes Are Alike
A simple reminder is in order.  Class actions cover an enormous
span of events and substantive law.  They include enforcement of small
dollar claims that yield little significant relief to any individual class
member, and that entail little risk of individual loss but have the hope of
enforcing significant social policies; enforcement—or defeat—of vitally
important individual claims, as seen in contemporary efforts to address
mass torts; restructuring social institutions such as public schools or
prisons; policing the markets, as in the now virtually routine securities
and antitrust litigation; and expanding the effective reach of anti-
discrimination legislation.
It is far from clear that a single rule of procedure can sensibly ad-
dress all of these different circumstances.  The forms of group litigation
that have emerged in civil law systems seem to be tailored to relatively
specific substantive areas.8  In framing new rules, it should be asked
whether to begin with one or a few uses, whether to address different
uses through separate rules, and whether to leave the way open for new
and perhaps unanticipated uses to emerge as the new rule matures in
practice.
H.  The American Jury
It is not possible to sketch the differences that separate U.S. expe-
rience from the rest of the world without noting the American Jury.
The impact of class certification on subsequent events, particularly set-
tlement, can be affected both by predictability and unpredictability.  In
some circumstances the parties and lawyers may feel confident about
predicting a jury’s verdict, accounting for the impact that a trial on be-
half of a class will have on presentation of the case and on jury reac-
tions.  It may be easier to be confident in predicting the impact of certi-
fication on the course and cost of preparation. A nonjury trial, for
8. See, e.g., Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 369 (2001).
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example, can more easily be managed in separate stages, although as-
bestos trials in particular have produced many examples of separating
injury, causation, and liability by bifurcation, trifurcation, and “reverse
trifurcation.”  In many circumstances, the jury will be viewed as a will-
fully unpredictable element whose potential capriciousness dramatically
escalates the uncertainties of the proceeding.  Certification in those
cases multiplies the risks of the litigation, with a corresponding increase
in the pressure to settle.
Jury trial has another limiting impact.  Many events that affect
large numbers of people generate claims that require that both common
and individual elements be decided.  Proof of a common fraud or mis-
representation, for example, may be followed by the need to prove ac-
tual reliance.  In the mass tort context, proof that a product was defec-
tive because it generally increases the risk of a particular injury may be
followed by questions of individual causation, comparative responsibil-
ity, and damages.  There can be enormous advantages in resolving the
general causation question and any related element of fault once and
uniformly for all claimants.  The resolution can be submitted to a jury.
The difficulty comes at the next stage.  No single jury could resolve the
common class issue and then continue to sit until all individual issues for
all class members were resolved.  But submitting the individual issues to
other juries may defeat the class action enterprise.  It is difficult to
imagine a coherent determination of the specific cause of a particular
person’s injury without reexamining the evidence of general causation.
It is impossible to imagine a coherent determination of comparative re-
sponsibility without reexamining the responsibility of all parties.  Muti-
lating the later jury’s inquiry by directing it to find general causation and
defendant responsibility may distort determination of the remaining is-
sues, and may confront the jury with an impossible task if it disagrees
with the mandatory assumptions.  The direction may be required, how-
ever, by the Seventh Amendment prescription that “no fact tried by
jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.”9
A procedural system that relies entirely on judges may be able to
avoid these problems in large part.  Without a jury, a single judge may
be able to establish procedures that enable disposition of vast numbers
of individual issues without delegation.  And if delegation is required, it
may be better managed—it is easier to communicate foundation as-
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see generally In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,
1302-1304 (7th Cir. 1995).
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sumptions to other judges, and easier for professional judges to resolve
related issues without reexamining the foundations.
It would be difficult to formulate any general statement of the ways
in which U.S. class action procedure has been shaped by jury trial.  But
it is clear that other countries are free to develop their procedures with-
out this constraint.  Jury trial provides one more reason for caution in
transporting Rule 23 into other systems.
II.  MORE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
A.  Categories of Classes
U.S. practice recognizes three categories of classes: mandatory
(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes; opt-out (b)(3) classes; and—under at least two
statutes—opt-in classes.10  During the earlier phases of the current Advi-
sory Committee studies, a draft was prepared that eliminated the cate-
gorical distinctions between these forms.  In place of defined categories,
the court would be directed to consider the reasons for certifying a class
and to determine, in light of those reasons, whether to permit exclusion,
or whether to limit the class to those who expressly seek to be in-
cluded.11  The proposal reflected concern that the necessarily broad lan-
guage of Rule 23(b) does not provide much guidance in distinguishing
between mandatory and opt-out classes, and a parallel concern that
some group actions might better be limited to those who seek to be in-
cluded.  It is reasonable to suppose that the opportunity to opt out
should be denied only when, apart from the difficulties arising from
sheer numbers, individual class members would become mandatory in-
dividual parties under Civil Rule 19.12  It is more than reasonable to
suppose that a rule that includes all class members who do not request
exclusion is not functionally equal to a rule that includes only those class
members who do request inclusion.  Accommodation of the interests
served by class litigation with the interests of individual class members
may be advanced by directing case-by-case balancing of the class action
advantages of effective enforcement, efficiency, and consistency against
10. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
11. See 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note *, at 3 (reprinting the Nov. 1992 draft); see also Ed-
ward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 13, 64-67 (1996)
(setting out a later draft).
12. See STAFF OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND WORKING GROUP ON MASS
TORTS, REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION app. § F-8(e) (1999) (setting out a draft Civil Rule
23(b)(1)).
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the dangers of mistaken class definition, the importance and realistic
prospect of individual litigation, the burdens and risks imposed on the
class adversary, and the costs of judicial administration.
The range of choices is apparent.  Opt-in classes provide assur-
ances that opt-out classes do not.  A class member who requests in-
clusion knows of the litigation and has an opportunity to reflect on
potential conflicts of interest and the probable adequacy of represen-
tation.  The opt-in member also has some wish to enforce the under-
lying right; there is no risk that the action will “enforce” the “right” of
a person who disagrees with the underlying theory and prefers that
the claim be rejected.  Opt-in classes may also support simplified no-
tice procedures—the object of notice is to enable class litigation, not
to protect against unknowing loss of rights.
Opt-out classes are likely to include more members than an opt-in
class chosen for the same dispute.  The force of inertia is augmented by
the sensible reaction of many people that reading the notice and decid-
ing whether to become involved in a legal proceeding is not worth the
effort.  An opt-out class also changes the purpose of notice.  It becomes
more important to explain the underlying dispute, the consequences of
remaining in the class or requesting exclusion, and the means of re-
questing exclusion.  The need to bring notice home to class members is
likely to seem greater, engendering greater expense.  Beyond these me-
chanical concerns, it becomes more important that the court assume re-
sponsibility for monitoring the adequacy of class representation and for
defining a class whose members have no significantly conflicting inter-
ests.
A mandatory class raises still higher the importance of class defini-
tion and adequate class representation.  The elimination of any oppor-
tunity to request exclusion reduces in some measure the importance of
providing notice to all members, but notice to a significant number of
members is important to provide opportunities to challenge certification
and class definition, and to monitor the adequacy of representation.
In the United States there are several major obstacles to rethinking
the categorical approach to class definition.  Some class action students
no doubt believe that they understand the role of (b)(1) classes, not-
withstanding the recent failed flirtation with “limited fund” classes in
mass tort litigation.13  Many continue to share the primary concern that
motivated adoption of (b)(2) classes in the 1966 revision—the vital ad-
vances made in civil rights litigation through class-based injunctions
13. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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must be preserved.  Advocates of consumer class actions greet with cries
of horror any prospect that a judge hostile to the underlying legal theory
might effectively scuttle a (b)(3) class by choosing an opt-in class over
an opt-out class.  Fundamental restructuring at this level is not likely to
occur soon.
There is little indication that any other system, however close to or
distant from U.S. procedure, has even considered adoption of the basic
categorical distinctions that shape much of U.S. practice.  That is reas-
suring.  But the choice between mandatory, opt-out, or opt-in ap-
proaches still must be made in some fashion.  If more than one ap-
proach is adopted, some means of selection must be framed.
B.  Certification Decision
At least one country—Australia—has apparently devised a class
procedure that does not require court certification of the class.14  It is
difficult to believe, however, that a group action can be maintained on
any basis other than pure opt-in without some measure of court control.
The risks of sloppy class definition are too great, including fundamental
conflicts of interest and indeterminate res judicata consequences.  The
risks of indifferent or incompetent representation both by the named
class member parties and by class counsel are also great.  The dangers of
a purely representative-defined class are particularly acute when the ac-
tion is resolved by settlement.  In settling, the class adversary is inter-
ested in spreading the res judicata net as wide as possible.  The class
representative may not have adequate incentive to resist, and the court
has had no prior encounter with the class definition question to guide its
review of the settlement.
To suggest strong reasons for court definition of the class and for
court assurances of adequate representation is not to say that all systems
should adopt the Rule 23 requirement that the court rule on class certi-
fication “[a]s soon as practicable.”  Actual practice under Rule 23 is to
decide on certification when practicable.15  The decision often is de-
ferred for ruling on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment; de-
14. See S. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, supra note 1.  Legislation proposed for Sweden also
dispenses with any certification requirement.  See Roberth Nordh, Group Actions in Sweden: Re-
flections on the Purpose of Civil Litigation, the Need for Reforms, and a Forthcoming Proposal, 11
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 381 (2001).
15. This point was made in the proposal to amend Rule 23(c)(1) to require certification “when
practicable.”  PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
APPELLATE, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 39-40, 43, 53-54 (1996),  re-
printed in 167 F.R.D. 535, 557-565 (1996).
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fendants, recognizing that pre-certification victory will bind only the
representative plaintiffs, prefer such relatively efficient disposition to
the risks and burdens of class litigation.  Other systems, particularly
those that proceed through fact inquiry on a rolling basis that does not
sharply divide pretrial and trial events, may find it desirable to adopt
greater flexibility for timing of the certification decision, but some ana-
logue to certification still seems essential.
The importance attached to the class certification decision is re-
flected by the only amendment that has so far emerged from the ongo-
ing Advisory Committee Study.  New Rule 23(f) provides for interlocu-
tory appeal, with discretionary permission of the court of appeals, from
a decision that grants or denies class certification.16  The circumstances
that make this provision desirable may be unique to U.S. federal court
practice.  Perhaps the most important elements are the “final judgment”
rule that ordinarily defeats interlocutory appeals, the strong prospect
that once a class is certified the outcome will be a settlement that de-
feats any review of the certification, and the corresponding difficulty of
generating any developed body of precedent on many class action ques-
tions.17  Other systems that in form do not rely on precedent and that
have built quite different relationships between trial courts and appel-
late courts may find this provision simply quaint.
C.  Notice
The role of class notice has been noted in discussing the choice
among mandatory, opt-out, and opt-in classes.  The U.S. model merits
improvement; Canada provides a useful model.18
The first question of notice is universal.  The attempt to frame no-
tice in plain language is frustrated at almost every turn.  Cogent expla-
nation of the nature of a dispute that arises under uncertain facts and
vague or developing law is a nearly insurmountable challenge.  Even the
routine matters that could be covered by uniform language in every no-
tice defy easy explanation: for example, the opportunity to monitor the
effectiveness of representation; class participation (which must neces-
sarily be affected by the size of the class, the nature of the dispute, the
personalities of counsel, the organization chosen for coordinating coun-
sel, the reality of class representation by any member, and still other fac-
16. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
17. The developing administration of Rule 23(f) is described in 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
7, § 3931 (Supp. 2001).
18. See Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 269 (2001).
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tors); objections to a proposed settlement; and the consequences of de-
ciding whether to request exclusion.  In the U.S. system of rulemaking,
these questions may not yield readily to a rule-based answer.  An ad-
monition to use plain language can be added to the rule.  Beyond that,
more may be accomplished by accumulating and publishing models of
good notices for various types of actions, in the hope that parties and
courts will be inspired to copy the good rather than reinvent the bad.19
Other notice questions are in part general and in part more system-
specific.  Civil Rule 23 integrates notice requirements with the manda-
tory/opt-out class categories, a system-specific approach.  But the un-
derlying questions arise in any system.  The Advisory Committee has
long had before it a notice proposal that addresses some of the prob-
lems that are well-entrenched in current practice.20  For the first time,
there would be a specific notice requirement for mandatory classes; no-
tice would be required to reach a sufficient number of class members to
ensure a reasonable prospect that some will monitor the class definition,
choice of class representatives, and the ongoing adequacy of representa-
tion.  The requirement that individual notice be directed to all (b)(3)
class members who can be identified with reasonable effort would be
reduced for small-claims classes, requiring individual notice only for a
sampling of members.21  The draft also opened up the possibility that the
class adversary might be directed to pay part or all of the costs of class
notice, but it was prepared at a time when this feature could be con-
nected to a proposal that the court consider the probable success of the
class position in deciding whether to certify a class.  In current practice,
defendants often pay the cost of notifying a plaintiff class because certi-
fication and notice are coupled with a settlement agreement.  There
may be some way to reframe this proposal.  At any rate, these questions
must be addressed in any form of group litigation.
Several countries contemplate notice to class members of major
events in the progress of the action.22  The cost of postal notice, in rela-
tion to the probable benefit, may seem high.  But as electronic commu-
nication has exploded, this idea seems much more attractive.  A web
page could be established for any class that includes members with indi-
vidually substantial claims, or that concerns matters of general public
importance.
19. The Federal Judicial Center is working on a project to develop model class-action notices.
See Civil Rules Advisory Committee Agendas for October 2000 and April 2001.
20. 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note *, at 55, 58-60 (discussing February 1996 draft Rule 23(c)).
21. See id.
22. See, e.g., Nordh, supra note 14.
COOPER.DOC 08/06/01  1:24 PM
234 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 11:215
D.  Preliminary Evaluation of Merits
The recent reconsideration of Civil Rule 23 included several ver-
sions of a proposal that would allow the court to consider the probable
merits of a class claim in deciding whether to certify a (b)(3) class.23  The
underlying idea was simple enough: class certification can have great
consequences, not only in shaping the burdens and risks of the litigation
but also in capital markets and perhaps elsewhere.  It may seem unfair
to inflict these costs on the party opposing the class without a prelimi-
nary showing that the class claim has some plausible substance.  Plain-
tiffs and defendants united, however, in opposing the proposal.  Defen-
dants expressed several concerns.  The most prominent began with the
view that no matter how carefully the rule might be phrased, litigation
of the class-certification question would approach full-scale litigation of
the merits, including demands for sweeping discovery.  The next most
prominent was linked to the first—particularly following so much effort,
certification after a supposedly preliminary finding of colorable merit
would have a devastating impact both in real-world reaction to the liti-
gation and in the pressure to settle.  It might seem surprising that an
idea so unpopular with defendants should also be unpopular with plain-
tiffs but—perhaps because plaintiffs’ representatives were thinking of
different types of class actions than defendants’ representatives were
contemplating—plaintiffs also objected.  Support was lacking even for a
draft that called for consideration of the merits only if requested by the
party opposing class certification.
An idea so broadly unpopular may indeed be bad.  It is widely be-
lieved, however, that many U.S. judges exercise the broad discretion
built into present Rule 23 to deny certification on this basis.  The idea
may not be entirely bad.  In other systems, built around different sub-
stantive rules and different surrounding judicial institutions and proce-
dures, some preliminary view of the merits may remain a useful element
of class certification.  This prospect seems particularly promising in sys-
tems that, under direction of the court, permit staged inquiry into the
merits.  It may prove easier in such systems to achieve a preliminary
sense of the probable outcome without bearing the costs feared in the
U.S. system.
23. 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note * at 55, 56-57 (discussing the Feb. 1996 draft Rule
23(b)(3)).  Rejection of the proposal is reflected in Draft Minutes Apr. 18, 1996, Civil Rules Advi-
sory Committee, 167 F.R.D. 540, 548-551 (1996).
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E.  Classes That Help Lawyers, Not Members
At least one part of popular culture in the United States believes
that class actions are driven by the greed of attorneys, not the prospect
of real benefit to class members.  Attorney fees may exceed the tangible
benefits to class members, and some “coupon” settlements may actually
benefit defendants more than class members when the coupon is re-
deemed with a discounted purchase from the defendant.  The percep-
tion, and the results that feed it, often are linked to class actions that
arise from small-scale injuries to many consumers.
Attempts to address this concern have proved difficult.  The pro-
posed Civil Rule 23 amendments published for comment in 1996 in-
cluded a new factor for determining whether to certify a (b)(3) class:
“whether the probable relief to individual class members justifies the
costs and burdens of class litigation.”24  The draft Committee Note sug-
gested a particular view of class actions: “The prospect of significant
benefit to class members combines with the public values of enforcing
legal norms to justify the costs, burdens, and coercive effects of class ac-
tions that otherwise satisfy Rule 23 requirements.  If probable individual
relief is slight, however, the core justification of class enforcement
fails.”25  Substitution of private enforcement for public enforcement is
therefore not enough alone to justify resolution by a court.  Adversary
litigation requires meaningful individual injury and the prospect of
meaningful individual relief.  The spirit was captured in the phrase that
came to characterize this draft as the “just ain’t worth it” proposal.  As
was expected, the proposal drew heavy opposition.  The “just ain’t
worth it” proposal has gone no further, and does not seem likely to be
pressed in the near future.  The proposal does, however, serve to frame
a question that should be asked by every system developing a class ac-
tion practice.  Does our system of law really need to supplement public
enforcement of public values by private enforcement?  Always?  No
matter how trivial the injury and how uncertain the wrong?  The Swed-
ish proposal would provide for a class proceeding if it “is not otherwise
24. 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note *, at 143, 144 (discussing Proposed Rule 23(b)(3)(F)); see
also 167 F.R.D. 559 (1996).  The February 1996 draft, then Rule 23(b)(3)(G), looked to the public
interest as well: “whether the public interest in—and the private benefits of—the probable relief
to individual class members justify the burdens of the litigation. . . .”  1 WORKING PAPERS, supra
note *, at 55, 57.
25. 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note *, at 143, 152; see also Committee Note on Proposed Rule
23, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, 167 F.R.D. 563 (1996).
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considered to be inappropriate.”26  Open-ended language like this might
accomplish what the “just ain’t worth it” proposal failed to achieve.
An answer to this question will turn in part on the motivations that
drive private class action litigation.  Some observers in the United States
fear that much of this litigation is driven by a desire for attorney fees
and nothing more.  Not as much attention is directed to another possi-
ble concern that interest groups will pursue agendas that are against the
public interest by taking advantage of vaguely worded laws that respon-
sible public officials would not seek to enforce against the challenged
conduct.  Other countries may share this concern.  Much will turn on
the broad factors described above: what is the nature of the substantive
law that may be enforced through a class action, and what are the inter-
ests of those who drive the litigation, whether they be lawyers or citizens
with an agenda?
An alternative response to the fear that class litigation may not
reflect any concern for class members would be to shift to an opt-in
class.  Intervention by class members demonstrates a genuine class in-
terest; lack of intervention defeats class litigation.  The difficulty with
this approach is that it is likely to work—if at all—only on a general-
ized basis.  It is difficult to identify in a rule the circumstances of sus-
pect motivation that justify a choice to certify an opt-in class rather
than an opt-out class.  One approach would be to assume that indi-
vidual class members do not care about very small monetary recov-
eries, relying on opt-in procedure to identify the class members who
do care.  This approach, however, could easily defeat many consumer
class actions, without a clear justification for the assumption that class
members do not care about the money or about vindicating the public
interest.
F.  Selecting Class Representatives
One current Advisory Committee question is whether courts
should assume greater responsibility for selecting class representatives.27
As noted earlier, some observers believe that class representatives are
often tokens.  The class lawyers recruit representatives who, for inability
or lack of interest, do not take on any meaningful role as clients.  One
response might be to accept as the class representative the person who
initiated the inquiry and litigation, and who has the resources of experi-
26. See Nordh, supra note 14.
27. An early draft class action attorney appointment rule was included in the October 2000
Advisory Committee Agenda.
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ence, intellect, interest, and mettle to be a real client.  That approach
might be attacked as an untoward intrusion on the private-attorney-
general role of class actions.  An alternative response is to focus, as ade-
quacy of representation inquiries now tend to, on the qualifications of
class counsel.  The current draft would make the court responsible for
appointing class counsel, and would require an application procedure
that details the elements needed for effective representation.28  In addi-
tion, independent investigation and development of the class position
would be substituted for “first to file” as an important element.  The
draft, by requiring disclosure of “the terms proposed for attorney fees
and expenses,” is compatible with the auction procedures that have
been used by a few courts.29 The potential disadvantages of an auction
procedure are real, however, and may deserve a cautionary note.
It is difficult to guess whether these questions are relevant in other
systems.  The systems that call for registration of organizations that wish
to launch group actions, for example,30 look to procedural vehicles that
are rather different from class actions in the United States.  Even if
something closer to the U.S. class action procedure is introduced, the
traditions of the bar may not soon develop to a point that generates
concern over “entrepreneurial lawyering.”  Different relationships be-
tween court and counsel may change the character of the questions, al-
ready awkward under the adversarial traditions of the United States,
that arise from making the court responsible for selecting the advocates
that pursue the case.  Perhaps it is sufficient to note that this is a specific
point at which differences in the roles played by lawyers in different sys-
tems must be taken into account.
G.  Pretrial Dependence
U.S. Pretrial procedure has been often studied in other countries,
and—particularly with respect to discovery procedures—often shunned.
Development of a system of group litigation requires consideration of
the role of pretrial procedure or the absence of any particular distinc-
tion between pretrial and trial.  Discovery may be particularly impor-
tant.  The opportunity to capture information by discovery is vitally im-
portant to the success of many claims pursued through class litigation in
the United States.  The opportunity to impose enormous burdens by
seemingly valid discovery requests may create pressure to settle class
28. See Rule 23(h), Apr. 2001 Agenda.
29. See id.  See also In re Auction House Antitrust Litigation, 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
30. See Walter, supra note 8.
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claims.  This pressure is particularly troubling when it coerces settle-
ment of weak claims.  General opportunities to pursue discovery against
individual class members, on the other hand, might become an effective
tool to coerce requests for exclusion or favorable settlement.31  Even en-
tirely legitimate discovery may become so invasive as to raise serious
questions, particularly as the full reaches of discovering computer-based
information come to be explored.  These general discovery problems,
however, do not seem peculiar to class litigation; they only establish part
of the framework for measuring the net social costs of encouraging class
litigation.
The need for caution is obvious.  Other countries, in assessing the
development of class action practices in the United States, must bear in
mind the significant impact of underlying discovery practices.  Different
discovery practices may reduce the costs of class actions, but also may
reduce the benefits.  The calculations are complex and uncertain.
H.  Settlement
Only a tiny fraction of civil litigation in the United States persists to
trial.  Actions disappear before trial for many reasons.  One common
reason is settlement.  Failure to settle a healthy portion of the cases that
now settle could bring most courts to a grinding halt.  If it were not pos-
sible to settle class actions, it might be necessary to adopt drastic restric-
tions on present class action practice.
Although settlement is a necessary option, it also is fraught with
risks.  The central problem is plain enough.  Actual adjudication of class
claims or defenses makes the class representative responsible only for
effective adversary presentation.  Decision by a judge provides broad
reassurance that the issues of fact and law have been considered and
fairly resolved.  Matters stand much differently when a class representa-
tive, ordinarily self- (or counsel-) selected and court-blessed, assumes
responsibility for compromising the class position without adjudication.
The representative, under the aegis of class certification, then disposes
of class members’ rights without their consent.  Court review of the rea-
sonableness of the settlement provides some reassurance, but a court
cannot be expected to recreate a settlement process, explore all alterna-
31. Professor Watson describes a Canadian procedure that prima facie limits discovery to the
named parties, requiring leave of court to seek discovery from other individual class members.  See
Watson, supra note 18.
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tives, and determine whether the compromise is an optimal balance of
competing forces.32
This central problem is aggravated by potential conflicts of interest
between class counsel and class members.  Settlement virtually assures
compensation.  Proceeding further toward trial, and trial itself, may im-
pose great burdens and the risk of losing everything.  Particularly when
representative class members are ill-equipped for the client role, the
court’s responsibility in reviewing the proposed settlement becomes
even greater.  Matters can be still worse when there are competing class
actions, or the prospect of competing class actions.  Counsel then face
the threat that some other lawyer will be prepared to resolve the same
class claim on terms more favorable to the defendant.  The result is a
“reverse auction” in which the defendant plays one team against an-
other until a satisfactorily low settlement offer is reached.
The continuing work of the Advisory Committee includes a settle-
ment proposal that seeks to respond to these concerns.33  The first
premise is that settlement must remain possible.  The most controversial
element of the present draft reflects a second premise that settlement by
representation, not by individual class member consent, cannot be fa-
vored.  This element would protect class members by creating an oppor-
tunity to opt out after the terms of settlement are announced, without
regard to the mandatory or opt-out character of the class.  This proposal
has met vigorous opposition.  Some opposition rests on the belief that
the essential character of a mandatory class must be protected.  Much of
the opposition, however, rests on the belief that effective settlement
would too often become impossible.  To be persuasive, this opposition
must be bolstered by a satisfactory explanation of the reasons why ini-
tial failure to request exclusion must come at the cost of establishing the
class representative’s authority to agree to a compromise that many
class members reject.  Initial evaluations of effective representation are
chancy enough; actual proof arising from the terms of settlement is
more persuasive evidence.  Another problem facing the opponents
arises from recognition that quite often class members do have an op-
portunity to opt out of a proposed settlement because class certification,
conditional approval of the proposed settlement, and notice all occur at
the same time.  If it is possible to negotiate a settlement acceptable to
class members before certification and the opportunity to request exclu-
sion, why is it not possible to do so later?  This feature of the proposal
32. See generally Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1943, 1969-1999 (2000) (exploring the difficulties of reviewing class action settlements).
33. See Agenda, Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Oct. 2000.
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may not long survive in its most sweeping form, but it deserves serious
consideration as part of any class action system.
A second difficulty with judicial review of a proposed settlement in
an adversary system is that the court seldom supervises an adversarial
contest over the terms of the settlement.  Class representatives and class
adversaries have joined in settlement, and join in presenting the settle-
ment to the court as a desirable accomplishment.  Only objectors pro-
vide the adversary presentation that the system depends upon, but ob-
jectors commonly labor at severe disadvantages.  Ordinarily objectors
have not been privy to the course of settlement negotiations.  They have
not developed the familiarity with the facts that class representatives
and class counsel should have developed.  Their individual stakes in the
outcome are likely to be relatively modest.  Objectors may fill an essen-
tial role, but they may be poorly positioned to do so.  At the same time,
experience suggests that objections can be misused for improper tactical
purposes.  Objections cause delay and expense.  It may be important to
carry out the settlement promptly, particularly if some individual class
members have urgent needs for relief.  It may even be important that
the settlement stand or fall quickly, so that effective trial preparation
can continue if need be.  An objector may seize these tactical advan-
tages for the purpose of winning personal advantage, not improving the
class position.  There are, in short, “good” objectors and “bad” objec-
tors.  It has not seemed possible to define the difference by rule.
An early draft of the Advisory Committee sought to bolster the
position of good objectors in several ways.34  The draft would require
proponents of a settlement to disclose (or, alternatively, submit to dis-
covery of) the terms of any agreements incidental to the settlement.35
Discovery on the merits of the class claims would be permitted to the
extent necessary to formulate meaningful objections, and successful
objections might be compensated by an award of attorney fees.36  The
draft attempted to address bad objectors, including a provision invoking
Rule 11 sanctions for frivolous or bad-faith objections.37  Court approval
would be required for settlement of an objection on terms that favor the
objector over the settlement terms available to the class.38  These are
small steps.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
37. See Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 33.
38. See id.
COOPER.DOC 08/06/01  1:24 PM
2001] CLASS ACTIONS IN QUESTIONS 241
The draft included still another provision that brought review of a
proposed settlement closer to the procedure in judge-directed systems.
The court could authorize an “independent investigation and report to
the court on the fairness of the proposal.”39  This provision would depart
from the ordinarily exclusive reliance on adversarial presentations to
the court.
Other approaches also have been considered, but have yet to win
favor.  A court might undertake to regulate the structure of settlement
negotiations: appointment of a guardian for the class, designation of ad-
ditional class representatives, creation of a “steering committee” of class
members who are not designated representatives, or even direct partici-
pation by a judge, are all possible.  Various experiments have been
made along these lines, and experience over time may yet revive con-
sideration of such devices.
Finally, it may be useful to create a rule text that catalogues many
of the factors that merit consideration in reviewing a proposed settle-
ment.  The draft provides such a list, including factors that may generate
some dispute.40  One calls for consideration of the existence and the
probable outcome of claims by other classes and subclasses.41  From one
perspective, the comparison seems natural: if the deal seems inadequate
in comparison to what others are likely to receive, rejection may be ap-
propriate.  From another, however, the comparison suggests concern
that the settlement may be too favorable to the class, or that it will di-
vert resources that should be husbanded to compensate other victims of
the same wrong or even victims of different wrongs.  The most obvious
concern is for future claimants, those who may suffer injury in the future
but who do not now have recognizable claims.  Authorizing judicial
consideration of this problem steps outside ordinary concepts of the ad-
versary system.  It does not seem plausible to theorize that the defen-
dant has failed an obligation to represent its adversaries, whether future
or present.  It may barely be plausible to theorize that representatives of
a defined class have some obligation to consider the interests of people
who are not class members.  But the essential responsibility seems to fall
to the court, with the aid of such non-class objectors as may appear.
It seems likely that settlement plays an important role in most judi-
cial systems.  For example, the attorney-fee provisions in Canada have
39. Id. at R. 23(e)(6).
40. See id. at R. 23(e)(5)(A), 23(e)(5)(K).
41. See id. at R. 23(e)(5)(H).
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not been much explored because most actions settle.42  Any class action
rule should go as far as possible to address the role of settlement.
I.  Settlement-Only Classes
The role of settlement is emphasized by certifying a class exclu-
sively for settlement and not for trial.  Settlement-only classes were a
familiar part of practice in the United States before the attempt was
made to extend them to mass-tort actions.43  Currently, it is proper to
certify a class for settlement, but only when the sole barrier to certifica-
tion for trial is “manageability.”44
The Advisory Committee has considered three alternative ap-
proaches to settlement-only classes.45  One would extend the use of
these classes beyond their present limits.  The second would seek to
capture current practice in express rule language.  The third monitors
developing lower-court experience for indications whether there is any
need to amend Rule 23.  The third approach has prevailed, at least for
now.
Certification only for settlement changes negotiating advantages,
but the effects are complicated.  It may seem that a class that cannot
threaten to go to trial as a class has lost an important bargaining threat.
But the alternatives to class action trial—such as a large number of indi-
vidual trials—may be worse for the defendant than a settlement favor-
able to the class, or for that matter, worse than a class action trial.  Much
depends on the alternatives available to the claimants by other means of
aggregation or—particularly with mass torts—individual litigation.  The
lure of “global peace” can be strong.
Apart from negotiating positions, settlement can claim real advan-
tages over litigated disposition.  Saving the transaction costs of trial or
multiple trials is obvious and important.  Avoiding inconsistent out-
comes, assuring consistent treatment on liability and at least roughly
comparable remedies, is equally important.  These benefits accrue un-
der a unitary legal system.  In a federal system, there are additional
benefits.  Differences in outcomes that derive from differences in courts
42. Watson tells us that imposition of cost sanctions on an unsuccessful plaintiff class represen-
tative has been rare because most cases are settled rather than dismissed.  See Watson, supra note
18.  Gidi, on the other hand, tells us that settlement is not at all common in Brazil.  Antonio Gidi,
Remarks at the Duke/Geneva Conference on Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Per-
spective: What Can We Learn from Each Other? (July 21-22, 2000).
43. See WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY, supra note *, at 34-35 (1996).
44. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
45. See Civil Rules Advisory Committee Agenda Apr. 2000 (http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
comment2001/text-0101.pdf).
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are reduced.  Finally, when claims are governed by state law, choice-of-
law difficulties are avoided.
Settlement class questions provide yet another illustration of issues
that are important, that are not readily resolved even in a system that
has developed substantial experience, and that are not likely to yield to
the same resolution in different systems.
J.  Future Claimants
Asbestos litigation provides the classic example of future injury.
Widespread exposure to asbestos has been followed by widespread in-
juries that become manifest over the course of several decades.  Even
today, there are untold tens of thousands of people who have been ex-
posed, who have no measurable present impairment or even signs of in-
cipient impairment, and who will suffer injury in the future.  Some pres-
ent remedies are possible: medical monitoring, compensation for the
fear of future injury, and compensation for the risk of future injury are
the leading contenders.  Each of these remedies remains uncertain or
unavailable for many claimants.  The important injuries and the impor-
tant remedies lie in the future.
It might seem sufficient to leave future problems to future disposi-
tion.  There are at least two major difficulties with this approach.  One,
amply demonstrated by asbestos experience and potentially applicable
in other mass torts, is that providing present remedies for present inju-
ries may exhaust the resources available for compensation.  Present vic-
tims take all at the expense of future victims.  The other, less poignant,
is that it is desirable to achieve a single disposition of common issues;
the basic elements of liability are established (or refuted) and need not
be continually relitigated.
These difficulties may be addressed by bringing future claimants
into a single proceeding with present claimants.  Representation be-
comes more important because there is little prospect that effective no-
tice can be given to future claimants.  The representatives must be free
from conflicting interests, a problem that has derailed the most promi-
nent attempts to bring future claimants into class proceedings.46  There
may be some need to demonstrate the prospect that taken together,
present and future claims exceed the assets available for payment.  The
present structure of Civil Rule 23 has emphasized the difficulty on this
score when a “limited fund” class justification has been attempted.47
46. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
47. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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There is a serious proposal intended to address these contingencies by
providing for discharge of future claims through bankruptcy procedures,
thereby providing independent representation for future claimants
without requiring a demonstration of probable insolvency.48
The possibility that future claims might be resolved does not tell us
how to do it.  It may be that bankruptcy-like procedures are better than
class action-like procedures, although an evaluation of that prospect re-
quires intimate familiarity with the tribunals that would administer each
set of procedures.  Yet again, the answers that prove suitable to one
country cannot be adopted for any other country without careful reflec-
tion.
K.  Fluid Recovery
One of the difficulties encountered frequently in class actions is the
actual delivery of individual remedies to all class members.  This prob-
lem is particularly evident in actions yielding very small individual re-
coveries.  Even if this difficulty can be overcome, the cost of distribution
may exceed the benefits conferred.  The best way to apportion remedies
to wrongs may be to bypass any individual relief, or to direct unclaimed
individual relief to other uses.  This might enforce the public interest
without over- or under-deterrence.  For example, a defendant that has
misled consumers might be ordered to support a consumer education
program, or to deliver goods to a worthy organization.  Such measures
are commonly referred to as “fluid” or “cy pres” remedies.
Deliberate development of fluid recoveries through Civil Rule 23
may lie beyond the reach of the Rules Enabling Act, the statute that
authorizes the Supreme Court to adopt and amend the Civil Rules.49
Enabling Act rules are not to abridge, enlarge, or modify any substan-
tive right.  Rule 23 does not authorize actions to enforce the public in-
terest on behalf of the public and perhaps cannot do so.  Within the
Rules Enabling Act or not, there is no apparent disposition to draft a
rule to regulate fluid recoveries.  Courts that experiment with such
remedies must find implied authority from the statute being enforced or
the development of common law principles. Even with such substantive
roots, the result is at least slightly removed from the traditional view
that courts in the United States act at the behest of private litigants to
resolve private disputes.  And justification must be found for the awk-
48. See Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years, Report of National Bankruptcy Review Com-
mission, at 315-350 (1997).
49. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (1988).
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ward complication that the fluid remedy either cuts off individual en-
forcement by class members—as a class action should—or leaves the
defendant subject to double liability.
Other countries, looking to different rulemaking procedures and
different traditions of the judicial function, may find these questions less
difficult.  The issue again is the social role of class actions, and different
answers are easily possible.
L.  Attorney Fees
The sensitivity of attorney fee issues in the United States may re-
sult in part from the unique “American Rule” that fees are not required
to be shifted from victor to vanquished.  Several statutes, however, have
identified circumstances in which fee shifting between parties is appro-
priate.50  And class fee awards often do not take the form of fee shifting.
It has long been accepted that members of a successful class should
compensate the class attorneys out of their gains just as an individual
plaintiff must subtract the attorney’s fees from the award.  It is also rec-
ognized, although reluctantly by some, that class attorneys bear risks,
and devote time and talent, to advance many worthy causes.  Even a
large class fee award, moreover, may transfer less money to lawyers
than would be transferred by alternative means of disposition.  It is
commonly reported, for example, that vast numbers of individual asbes-
tos claims continue to settle on the terms established by the failed
Georgine settlement, subject only to the difference that the contingent
fees are greater than would have been permitted by the settlement.
Sensitivity to fee awards thus tends to be expressed directly by fo-
cusing on the amount of the award, or by focusing on the amount of the
award in relation to the value recovered by the class.  Some part of the
debate may be fueled by jealousy or resentment that even highly skilled,
hard working, and public-spirited professionals should command hand-
some fees.  Another part may derive from the belief that more of the
money should go to the class. But common criticism seems to reflect a
view of class action lawyers as buccaneers who command rates far
above market levels by seizing the coercive opportunities of ill-founded
class claims.  It is very difficult to know whether this view is supported
by a significant number of real-world instances.  It persists nonetheless
and suggests that it is important that courts rigorously attend the duty to
review fee awards.
50. A convenient list of 119 fee-shifting statutes is attached to Justice Brennan’s dissent in
Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 44-51 (1985).
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These pressures have led the Advisory Committee to consider a
rule that would express and to a limited extent regulate judicial respon-
sibility to review class attorney fees.51  Only a tentative beginning has
been made, and the current view is that no attempt should be made to
choose between the “lodestar” approach based on hourly compensation
and the “percentage-of-class-recovery” approach.
Given the differences in context, it is unlikely that other countries
will find much practical benefit in observing these struggles.  Our prob-
lems may be irrelevant in face of the nearly universal principle that the
loser should pay at least a significant portion of the winner’s legal fees,
long experience in administering the principle, and the different levels
of professional compensation.
Different rules for attorney fees, however, may present quite dif-
ferent questions to other countries.  Canada, for example, adheres to
the rule that named representatives of a losing plaintiff class must bear
responsibility for the defendant’s “party and party costs.”  Canada has
tempered this approach by creating a “Class Proceedings Fund” that is
liable for the defendant’s costs if the Fund provides assistance to the
class plaintiff.52  This reduced exposure reflects an apparent appreciation
for the public role assumed by the class plaintiff and a desire to encour-
age actions of the sort deemed worthy of Fund support.  Other coun-
tries that believe in the general social utility of privately initiated class
actions would do well to consider similar devices.
III.  WHAT ELSE?
This brief and eclectic survey has not attempted to describe a com-
prehensive theory of class or group litigation.  There is no attempt to
compare any variation on such representative litigation to alternative
modes of aggregating private enforcement or relying on public en-
forcement.  The issues that are addressed are presented as sketches,
without extended elaboration or documentation.  Perhaps the greatest
omission is any observation on the overall value of class actions.  The
omission is deliberate.  An academic observer easily can be caught in a
painful bind.  U.S. practice can, on reasonably close observation, offer
vast theoretical difficulties.  Nothing more than assertion and ongoing
practice justify the working conclusion that an individual can lose valid
rights by a judicial decree provoked by a complete stranger who has
volunteered to “represent” a class of others.  Discomfort with this situa-
51. See Civil Rules Advisory Committee Agenda, Oct. 2000.
52. See Watson, supra note 18.
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tion increases when the decree rests on settlement, not adjudication.  A
strong theoretical argument could be made that class representation is
justified only when ordinary principles of mandatory joinder direct in-
clusion of numerous parties who share virtually indistinguishable inter-
ests and who cannot feasibly participate directly in the litigation.
These direct theoretical doubts may be supplemented by other
theoretical troubles.  Class actions demand much of adversary litigation,
perhaps too much.  Class actions support the full enforcement and over-
enforcement of substantive principles that are desirable, if at all, only
when enforced selectively.  These doubts arise from concern for the
class adversary, not for class members; for that reason, class actions may
lack principled justification as to any of the participants.
The trouble with such theorizing is that it overlooks the enormous
positive contributions that class actions can make and have made.
When there is clear and convincing proof that a clear and sensible rule
of law has been violated, causing more than de minimis injury, the ad-
vantages of class enforcement can be enormous.  In some settings, par-
ticularly the settlement of mass torts, the advantages may go beyond the
direct advantages of efficient and consistent enforcement of the law.
Terms may be achieved that are authorized by no law, but that achieve
better justice for most class members than could be accomplished under
any law.  It would be a tragic mistake to allow abstract theorizing to de-
feat the accomplishments of class action litigation.
The conclusion, in short, is that Civil Rule 23 is a work in prog-
ress.  To some significant extent it has been adapted to the needs of
U.S. legal institutions: the substantive law, the complications of a fed-
eral system, the judicial institutions, the attendant procedure and
joinder alternatives, and perhaps even the jury trial. The practical
successes, the workaday shortcomings, and the theoretical troubles of
the U.S. approach to the class action can all provide food for thought
as other countries develop their own systems.  There is, however, very
little beyond the general idea of group litigation that can be borrowed
without thorough reconsideration and adaptation to local needs and
capacities.  U.S. examples are interesting, provocative, sometimes
useful, and sometimes amusing.  Consider them in that spirit and the
U.S. system has much to offer.
